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Purpose:   The main purpose of this master thesis is to determine the factors that  
significantly influence the capital structure decisions in the global  
renewable energy sector during the period 2005-2013. 
Methodology: This study is implemented through a quantitative approach, using a  
panel data model, in which leverage is the dependent variable,  
controlled by a set of firm-specific, industry-specific, tax-related and  
   macroeconomic independent variables. 
Theoretical   The study is inspired by prior researches, which test capital structure  
Perspectives:  determinants and whether the trade-off or the pecking order theory  
   explains companies’ leverage decisions better. 
Empirical  67 renewable energy companies, part of RENIXX ® (Renewable  
Foundation:  Energy Industrial Index) during the period 2005-2013. All data  
was  obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon and Datastream. 
Conclusions: Our regression analysis reveals that the determinants which are  
positively and significantly correlated with leverage are size, 
tangibility and median industry leverage. We find that profitability, 
market-to-book assets, SG&A expenses to revenues, dividends to 
assets, listed firms dummy and common law dummy are in negative and 
significant relation with leverage. Overall, the global financial crisis did 
not have a strong impact on the majority of determinants affecting  
capital structure decisions in the studied sector. Our results are 
consistent with the framework of the dynamic trade-off theory. 
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1. Introduction 
The capital structure of a firm represents a combination of debt and equity sources of 
funding that allows the company to finance its overall operations and growth. Furthermore, 
decisions about leverage level, most commonly expressed by debt-to-total capital and debt-to-
assets ratios, affect significantly the risk profile of an entity. Investigating capital structure 
policies is a continuing concern in the field of corporate finance ever since the publication of 
Modigliani-Miller theorem (1958). From this time onwards, researchers have developed 
various capital structure models with the concepts of the trade-off and pecking order theories 
taking a central place (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973; Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
The trade-off theory postulates that company’s leverage decision is based on a trade-off 
between tax shield from debt financing and expected costs of future financial distress and 
bankruptcy. According to the pecking order theory, firms prefer internal to external financing 
and debt to equity due to adverse selection problems. Recently, a considerable literature has 
grown around the theme of capital structure determinants. Most prominent studies in the field 
are by Titman and Wessels (1988), Harris and Raviv (1991), Rajan and  Zingales (1995) and 
Frank and Goyal (2009), who provide empirical evidence for the effect of various factors in 
predicting leverage levels, and serve as an inspiration for the current master thesis.  
In the light of the financial crisis of 2008, capital structure decisions have turned out to 
be crucial for the survival of numerous companies, which paired with the raising importance 
of sustainability on a global scale, have drawn our attention to the renewable energy sector.  
First, this recent shock might have changed companies’ preferences for external and internal 
financing, which has increased the interest in investigating the effect of the crisis on capital 
structure determinants in different settings (Harrison and Widjaja, 2014; Proença, Laureano 
and Laureano, 2014). Second, the increasingly rapid advance in the global renewable energy 
sector in the past decade has led to series of publications regarding financing corporate 
growth, institutional investment opportunities and relevant risk management instruments in 
this field (Ettenhuber, 2013; Nelson and Pierpont, 2013; United Nations Environment 
Programme, 2004). Third, a notable empirical analysis by Brunnschweiler (2010), based on a 
panel data set of 119 non-OECD countries during the period 1980-2006, test the effect of 
financial intermediation on renewable energy generation. The author highlights that her 
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empirical results confirm the substantial positive influence of commercial banking 
development on the newer non-hydropower renewable energy technologies such as wind, 
solar, geothermal and biomass (Brunnschweiler, 2010). So far, however, there has been little 
discussion from a research perspective about the determinants of capital structure in the global 
renewable energy sector. Thus, we identify a knowledge gap that indicates a further need for 
detailed analysis. 
The aim of this master thesis is to determine the factors that significantly influence 
capital structure decisions in the global renewable energy sector during the period 2005-2013. 
The main focus of our research is to test the power of firm-specific factors such as 
profitability, size, growth, nature of assets and financial management policy, as well as tax-
related and industry-specific indicators on the leverage preferences of 67 renewable energy 
companies, part of the RENIXX ® (Renewable Energy Industrial Index). We consider the 
entities included in this index as a representative sample of the world market since this is the 
first global stock index that comprises the share performance of the world’s largest companies 
with more than 50 per cent of revenues coming from renewable energy (Renewable-energy-
industry.com, 2015). In order to measure the power of capital structure determinants, the 
approach to empirical research adopted in this thesis includes constructing and analyzing a 
panel data regression model with leverage as the dependent variable. To add further depth to 
our research, and to confirm the robustness of our results, several definitions of leverage are 
implemented. Furthermore, the analysis on the relation between capital structure and its 
determinants is twofold: first, based on the full sample, and second, on three sub-periods: 
2005-2007 (pre-crisis); 2008-2010 (crisis); 2011-2013 (post-crisis). The latter is incorporated 
with the aim to investigate whether the financial crisis had any impact on the association 
between leverage and its determining factors. In addition, we conduct a comparative test of 
the trade-off and pecking order theories’ factor predictions. Thus, we are able to determine 
which theory motivates capital structure choices in the global renewable energy sector better. 
Finally, taking into consideration that the companies in our sample are spread across 17 
countries with either common or civil law system (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; 1998), we examine whether the legal tradition has an impact on financing 
decisions. 
To our knowledge, the present study explores, for the first time, the effects of different 
factors on leverage decisions in the largest renewable energy companies. To date, research 
investigating the capital structure determinants has focused on a set of firms in a particular 
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country or region. To be more specific, previous publications tend to analyse the publicly 
traded enterprises from various industries in developed countries such as the United States 
(Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984; Castanias, 1983; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Frank and 
Goyal, 2009) or G-7 countries (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). When the analysis is on an 
industry level, researchers still tend to concentrate on traditional and leading sectors for the 
specific examined country (Banerjee and De, 2014). However, the current paper aims to shed 
light on the significant capital structure factors on a global scale. Furthermore, by studying 
companies from all around the world, we are able to investigate the effect of different legal 
traditions on leverage decisions. Thus, we contribute to the capital structure literature by 
examining the central determinants of leverage choices in one of the most challenging, high-
technological and fast developing sectors nowadays– the global renewable energy sector.  
1.1. The Global Renewable Energy Sector 
The global renewable energy sector consists of wind energy, solar power, bioenergy, 
geothermal energy, hydropower and fuel cells companies. In nowadays global economy, these 
renewable technologies have become a central matter of interest as an alternative to the finite 
sources such as carbon-based organically-derived fuels. Moreover, the adoption of renewable 
energy generation is a strategic measure to reduce emissions of the greenhouse gases, the key 
target of the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations, 1997). The main advantages of the new 
technologies include sustainability, significant socio-economic benefits, minimal impact on 
the environment, reduced cost of operations and less need for maintenance. Despite the 
reliability of supply and high initial capital requirements for construction, the global 
renewable energy sector has become a constantly growing market since 2004 (Renewables 
2014 Global Status Report, 2014).  
The renewable technologies would account for around half of the total electricity 
generation growth to 2040. The most significant expansion in renewable technologies is 
observed in non-OECD countries, led by China, India and Latin America (International 
Energy Agency, 2014, p.4). However, the European Union energy policy strongly promotes 
renewable sources and requires all EU member countries to fulfil at least 20 per cent of their 
total energy needs and 10 per cent of their transport fuel needs with renewables by 2020 
(Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2009). Although, the 
renewable energy projects used to rely strongly on subsidies in the past, the recent cost 
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reductions in the sector have decreased the need for governmental financial support. Thus, 
according to “Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2014” report, the 
competitiveness of the sector has been considerably improved (Frankfurt School of Finance & 
Management, 2014). All of the trends mentioned above indicate that the renewable sources of 
energy gain solid ground as an attractive market on a global scale.  
1.2. Thesis Outline 
Taking into consideration the raising importance of renewable energy and the 
identified empirical gap, we consider that a deeper analysis of the determinants of capital 
structure in the leading technological companies in this field is a relevant and fascinating 
problem from both theoretical and practical perspective. The remaining part of the master 
thesis proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review of related theoretical and 
empirical studies on capital structure and its determinants. Section 3 concentrates on the 
methodology and data used for our empirical research. Section 4 presents our findings, and 
analysis and discussion of the results. Finally, section 5 is concerned with conclusions and 
recommendations for further research. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
The first serious discussion and analysis of capital structure emerged during the 1950s 
with Modigliani and Miller (1958) Nobel Prize winning paper “The cost of capital, 
corporation finance and the theory of investment”. In this landmark study the two authors 
formulate five key assumptions, which characterize an ideal capital market:  
1) absence of frictions in capital markets (no taxes, transaction and bankruptcy costs);  
2) all investors share homogeneous expectations regarding the expected return on 
investments (insiders and outsiders have access to the same information);  
3) atomistic competition (the market is consisted of many small firms, which do not have 
the power to affect prices through trading or any other activity);  
4) no agency costs (companies have fixed and known investment program which 
maximizes shareholder value);  
5) fixed financing decisions.  
Having defined the ideal capital market setting, Modigliani and Miller derive the 
capital structure irrelevance proposition, stating that the market value of any firm is 
unaffected by the amount of leverage employed in financing its assets (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958). Even though the assumptions presented by the two authors are not observable in the 
real world, their paper contributes to a greater understanding of corporate financing decisions 
(Frank and Goyal, 2008). 
Modigliani and Miller’s work sparked further research which aimed to test departures 
from the ideal capital market assumptions. Frank and Goyal (2008, p.140) summarizes that 
when certain conditions, such as: “taxation, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, agency 
conflicts, adverse selection, lack of separability between financing and operations, time-
varying financial market opportunities, and investor clientele effects”, are taken into 
consideration, Modigliani-Miller theorem becomes inapplicable. The studies of these 
departures, however, have resulted in the formulation of many capital structure theories, with 
the two most notable being the trade-off and pecking order theories.  
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2.2. Trade-off Theory   
Five years after the publication of “The cost of capital, corporation finance and the 
theory of investment”, Modigliani and Miller (1963) issued a correction study, which adds 
corporate taxation and its related tax advantages to the original capital structure irrelevance 
proposition. Since the two authors do not identify any offsetting cost of debt, their results 
suggest the utmost 100 per cent debt financing as the most value adding (Frank and Goyal, 
2008). A broader perspective has been adopted by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) who argue 
that there is a trade-off between tax shield benefits and expected costs of future bankruptcy 
penalties. Later studies, researching the problem from an agency perspective, identify that 
debt mitigates overinvestment
 
problems of free cash flow and disciplines management to 
better work in shareholders’ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). The 
rationale behind the findings of these authors is that failure in debt repayment triggers 
bankruptcy. A study by Stulz (1990) highlights that even though debt plays an integral role in 
the alleviation of the overinvestment problem, it increases the underinvestment costs. 
Therefore, for every company there is a unique capital structure that balances between these 
two issues (Stulz, 1990).  
Frank and Goyal (2008) differentiate between static and dynamic trade-off theories. 
According to the authors, the former states that a company determines its leverage by 
considering the trade-off between the benefits and costs of debt only in a single period. On the 
other hand, the latter considers a longer time frame and the roles of expectations and 
adjustment costs. These cause the company to strategically deviate from its target capital 
structure and to adjust towards it over time (Frank and Goyal, 2008). 
2.3. Pecking Order Theory 
While a considerable amount of research has been published on the pecking order 
theory, it was initially formulated by Myers (1984). He claims that, before all, companies 
prefer internal sources of funds (retained earnings) and then, debt to equity if external 
financing is required. In another major study from the same year, Myers and Majluf (1984) 
motivate this ranking through Akerlof’s adverse selection model. Myers and Majluf (1984) 
argue that from investors’ perspective equity is associated with the highest adverse selection 
problem, while debt has a severely lower one and retained earnings completely avoid this 
issue.  The authors explain that market participants expect management to have superior 
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information. Thus, an equity issue would signal that the company is overvalued, which would 
result in a stock price drop (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Knowing this, insiders would also 
prefer to use retained earnings whenever possible, then debt, and as a last resort- equity 
(Frank and Goyal, 2009). Finally, Copeland, Weston and Shastri (2005) point out that the 
pecking order theory is dynamic and highly dependent on the company’s history. 
In an analysis of the pecking order theory, Helwege and Liang (1996) test its validity 
by examining the sources of funds of companies that went public in 1983 and operated in the 
period 1984-1992. In support of the pecking order theory, they provide evidence that firms 
with surplus avoid external financing. However, Helwege and Liang (1996) identify that 
when internal financing is insufficient, companies tend to issue equity, even if bank loans are 
obtainable. Another interesting result is that information asymmetry variables are insignificant 
determinants of whether debt or equity financing should be employed. Helwege and Liang 
(1996) conclude that they do not find supporting proof of a pecking order in external capital 
financing decisions.  
A significant analysis and discussion on the pecking order theory was presented by 
Frank and Goyal (2003). They test it by looking at 768 public companies which operated 
continuously for at least 19 years in the period 1971-1998. Contradicting the pecking order 
theory, Frank and Goyal (2003) report that external sources of funds are largely used and 
internal financing is only a small fraction of a company’s investment spending. Another 
inconsistency with the theory, identified by the authors, is that debt financing does not exceed 
equity issues. In addition, the latter follows budget shortfalls more closely compared to debt 
issues. Finally, Frank and Goyal (2003) results highlight that in their sample the pecking order 
actually work best for large firms, which opposes the theory’s initial implication of best fit to 
small high-growth companies.  
2.4. Trade-off Theory versus Pecking Order Theory 
Graham and Harvey (2001) use a survey to assess the various practices in corporate 
finance related to capital budgeting, cost of capital and capital structure.  Their study is based 
on the responses from 392 chief financial officers. The authors find out that 44 per cent 
reported that their companies had a target capital structure, while 37 per cent had a flexible 
one and 19 per cent- no target range. Furthermore, their results indicate moderate importance 
of interest deductibility, foreign taxation, cash flow volatility and financial flexibility 
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(maintaining low distress costs), which are all in line with the static trade-off theory. When it 
comes to the pecking order theory, there is evidence that large companies consider the level of 
undervaluation important for equity issues, while the same is not valid for small and non-
dividend paying ones. Overall, from their sample Graham and Harvey (2001) conclude that 
both the trade-off and the pecking order theories enjoy moderate support in the real world. 
Another key study comparing the models of capital structure under the static trade-off 
and pecking order theories is that of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999). Their research uses a 
sample of 157 firms, operating continuously in the period 1971-1989. In order to juxtapose 
the two theories, Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) construct two simple models: 
a) Pecking order model 
                      , 
with newly-issued or retired debt on the LHS. DEF stands for the cash flow deficit and 
is the sum of dividend payments, capital expenditures,   in working capital, the current 
portion of debt, and operating cash flows, net of tax and interest. Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) explain that DEF would be covered with debt only, since under the pecking order 
theory there is no incentive to issue equity due to its high information asymmetry. Therefore, 
in order the theory to hold, the expected value of the intercept   is zero and one for the 
slope   . 
b) Trade-off target adjustment model 
               
               , 
where     
  is the target capital structure of the company. 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) conclude that the pecking order theory (close to one 
  =0.75 and R-squared of 68 per cent) provides significantly better explanation of capital 
structure decisions compared to the trade-off (  =0.33 and R-squared of 21 per cent). 
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2.5. Capital Structure Determinants 
The current section presents the predictions postulated by the trade-off and pecking 
order theories regarding the most widespread researched capital structure determinants. First, 
we summarize the theoretical framework, and then, additional empirical evidence about the 
actual correlation between different factors and company’s leverage is provided. 
2.5.1. Theoretical Predictions 
After carefully examining the relevant literature, we have identified that the vast 
majority of researchers tend to focus on the same leverage determinants. The latter are divided 
into the following major groups: firm-specific, industry-specific, tax-related and 
macroeconomic, with the aim to provide a theoretical and well-structured explanation for 
factors’ influence on the capital structure decisions. 
Firm-specific determinants 
1) Profitability 
The pecking order theory predicts a negative correlation between profitability and 
leverage. The major assumption is that in the short run dividends and investments are fixed, 
and profitable companies prefer internal financing over external, and debt to equity when 
external sources of funding are used (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Thus, an increase in profits 
would result in a decrease in leverage. Findings from numerous studies prove the negative 
relation between company’s profitability and its leverage (Kester, 1986; Titman and Wessels, 
1988; Fama and French, 2002). Conversely, the static trade-off theory predicts a positive 
correlation between profitability and debt levels due to the expected tax benefits and lower 
costs of financial distress (Frank and Goyal, 2008). This theory postulates that more profitable 
companies are associated with lower bankruptcy costs. Thus, such firms are also able to 
maintain a higher debt level. The positive relation between profitability and leverage finds 
confirmation in several researches (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Jensen, 1986). On the other 
hand, the dynamic trade-off theory suggests that leverage is negatively associated to 
profitability mainly due to the fact that companies could finance their activities with 
accumulated internal funds, such as retained earnings. Thus, generating higher operating 
profit would support company’s decision to reduce its debt financing.  Furthermore, recent 
researches discuss the negative correlation between profitability and debt levels, pointing out 
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that if a company becomes more profitable and thus, more valuable, while still maintaining 
fixed debt level, its debt ratios would become lower (Hennessy and Whited, 2005; Titman and 
Tsyplakov, 2007; Strebulaev, 2007; Kayhan and Titman, 2007). 
2) Firm Size 
Generally, the pecking order theory is construed to predict a negative relation between 
size and leverage. The main explanation is that large companies are associated with lesser 
adverse selection problem and could access equity markets more easily in comparison to 
small firms (Myers, 1984). The trade-off theory, on the other hand, predicts a positive 
correlation between firm size and debt level. Overall, large companies are typically better 
diversified and enjoy more stable earnings, which enable them to maintain higher debt ratios 
without increasing financial distress costs (Ogden, Jen and O'Connor, 2003). Furthermore, 
such companies are less likely to go bankrupt due to their low volatility and information 
asymmetry. As a result, large entities benefit from better access to debt markets (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995). Numerous researches provide empirical evidence for the positive correlation 
between company size and its leverage (Warner, 1977; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen, 2008). 
3) Growth  
The pecking order theory predicts a positive relationship between growth and 
leverage. The reason behind is that high growth companies need to accumulate more external 
funds to finance their investment since internal sources are usually insufficient (Copeland et 
al. 2005). Conversely, the trade-off theory suggests that growth decreases free cash problems, 
but intensifies agency problems related to debt and escalates costs of financial distress (Frank 
and Goyal, 2009). Thus, this theory postulates a negative relation between growth and 
leverage. The market-to-book ratio is the most commonly used and highly reliable measure 
for companies’ growth opportunities (Adam and Goyal, 2008). The findings from empirical 
researches prove the negative correlation between the market-to-book ratio and leverage 
(Hovakimian, 2006; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). Other proxies for growth include capital 
expenditures to assets ratio and change in log assets, which are indicative for firm’s historical 
growth. Under the pecking order theory, capital expenditures as cash outflows directly 
increase the financing deficit (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999). Thus, this theory suggests a 
positive correlation between capital expenditures and firm’s debt level. Conversely, the trade-
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off theory predicts a negative relation. As previously stated, the main reason lies in the higher 
expected costs of financial distress. 
4) Nature of Assets 
Tangibility, measured usually as fixed assets to total assets ratio, is the most 
commonly used proxy for the nature of company’s assets. The pecking order theory predicts a 
negative correlation between tangibility and leverage. The major explanation is that tangible 
assets are characterized with low information asymmetry and thus, decrease the costs of 
equity issuance (Frank and Goyal, 2009). In contrast, the trade-off theory postulates that 
company’s leverage increases with tangibility. The reason behind is that fixed assets, being 
easier to value in comparison to intangibles, are used as collateral. Thus, the agency costs 
related to debt are reduced (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). According to Harris and Raviv (1991), 
companies with higher liquidation value, which are associated with more tangible assets, will 
maintain higher leverage. The portion of particular expenses to revenues could also be used as 
proxies of the nature of firm’s assets. For instance, companies with relatively high selling, 
general and administrative (SG&A) and research and development (R&D) expenditures are 
associated with more intangible assets and as a consequence, lower debt level (Long and 
Malitz, 1985; Frank and Goyal, 2009). 
5) Policy and Decision Factor 
Researchers place emphasis on the impact of financial policy, such as dividend 
payments, on company’s capital structure decisions. The pecking order theory states that the 
dividend payout ratio is negatively related with leverage (Myers, 1984). Conversely, the 
trade-off theory suggests that when levered companies pay more dividends, their debt ratio 
tends to increase as well (Ogden et al. 2003). However, when analysing the dividend and debt 
policies of companies, Fama and French (2002) provide findings consistent with both 
theories. For instance, the researchers conclude that more profitable companies pay more 
dividends and firms with more investments have lower dividend payout ratio. On the other 
hand, the authors point out that “short-term variations and earnings are absorbed by debt”, 
which is consistent with the pecking order theory (Fama and French, 2002, p.1). 
Industry-specific determinants 
A company’s capital structure decisions are affected not only by particular 
characteristics of the firm, but also by industry specific conditions. Overall, the industry 
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factors incorporate related, but otherwise omitted features that are common for all companies 
in the sector (Frank and Goyal, 2009). In addition, researches provide evidence of the strong 
industry effect on companies’ debt ratios (Schwartz and Aronson, 1967; Bradley et al. 1984). 
Furthermore, the median industry leverage is a widespread proxy for target capital structure 
(Gilson, 1997; Hull, 1999). Under the trade-off theory, a positive correlation between the 
industry median leverage and a firm’s debt level is expected, while the pecking order theory 
does not make a clear prediction. However, researchers prove empirically that companies tend 
to adjust their leverage towards the industry median level (Hovakimian, Opler and Titman, 
2001).  
Tax-related determinants 
Tax related determinants play a key role in the framework of the trade-off theory. The 
tax benefits of debt increase with higher tax rates. Thus, in order to fully take advantage of the 
tax shields, companies are willing to issue additional debt. For that reason, the trade-off 
theory predicts a positive correlation between tax rates and leverage (Haugen and Senbet, 
1986). Surprisingly, when using effective tax rate as one of the major tax-related 
determinants, studies provide empirical evidence about its negative relation with leverage 
(Antoniou, Guney and Paudyal, 2008; Karadeniz, Kandir, Balcilar and Onal, 2009). 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) introduce nondebt tax shields as substitute for the tax benefits 
of debt. Thus, proxies for the former such as depreciation expenses, net operating loss 
carryforwards and investment tax credits are expected to decrease company’s leverage (Frank 
and Goyal, 2009).  
Macroeconomic determinants 
The stability of the economic environment has a strong influence on companies’ 
capital structure decisions (De Jong et al. 2008). The most commonly examined 
macroeconomic determinants are expected inflation and GDP growth. The trade-off theory 
predicts a positive correlation between inflation and leverage. When inflation is expected to 
be higher, the tax deductions on debt increase as well (Taggart, 1985). The pecking order 
theory does not provide an explicit prediction regarding the association between inflation and 
leverage. However, the empirical evidence proves that expected inflation tends to be 
positively related to firm’s debt level (Frank and Goyal, 2009; Köksal and Orman, 2014). 
Regarding GDP growth, under the trade-off theory firms are more willing to issue additional 
debt during economic expansions due to increased taxable income and decreased expected 
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bankruptcy costs. On the other hand, the pecking order theory suggests a negative correlation 
between economic growth and company’s debt financing as the internal funds tend to rise 
during expansions (Frank and Goyal, 2009). 
2.5.2.  Empirical Evidence 
In order to test the influence of different factors on capital structure decisions, 
researchers have developed numerous empirical models. To start with, Harris and Raviv 
(1991) introduce a wide list of potential leverage determinants, including exogenous and 
endogenous factors as well as announcements of security issue. Moreover, the authors review 
relevant publications and relate these factors to capital structure theories based on agency 
costs, asymmetric information, market interactions and corporate control models 
(disregarding tax-based theories). Overall, Harris and Raviv (1991) summarize that previous 
studies (Bradley et al. 1984; Castanias, 1983; Kester, 1986; Marsh, 1982; Titman, 1984) 
provide empirical evidence that fixed assets, nondebt tax shields, growth opportunities and 
firm size are positively related to the level of leverage. Conversely, the latter tends to decline 
with volatility, advertising costs, R&D expenditures, profitability and bankruptcy probability 
(Harris and Raviv, 1991). Furthermore, Titman and Wessels (1988) present a factor-analytical 
technique, highlighting that firm’s leverage is negatively related to the uniqueness of the 
business. In contrast with the above mentioned empirical researches, the results by Titman 
and Wessels (1988) indicate that debt levels are not affected by nondebt tax shields, volatility, 
collateral value or future growth. In the view of all that has been mentioned so far, one may 
suppose that advocates of particular theories could find contradictory evidence from prior 
empirical studies. 
In another major study, Rajan and Zingales (1995) conduct a four-factor regression 
model to compare the power of determinants that influence the capital structure decisions in 
G-7 countries. The basic regression model in this paper is the following: 
                                                                         
                      
The authors identify market-to-book ratio, tangibility, profitability and sales as main 
determinants and conclude that on aggregate level the company’s leverage tend to be similar 
across G-7 countries. On the other hand, even after distinguishing between bank-oriented 
countries (Japan, Germany, France and Italy) and market-oriented ones (United States, United 
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Kingdom and Canada), this trend could not be explained simply by the underlying 
institutional differences (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). The provided results prove that market-
to-book ratio and profitability are negatively correlated to leverage. The authors consider that 
these negative relationships are driven mainly by large equity issuers in the observed 
countries. Conversely, tangibility has a positive influence on leverage as tangible assets are 
collateralizable and thus, decrease the agency costs of debt. However, this study does not 
identify a particular tendency in the association between company size and its leverage, while 
additionally disregarding industry specific and macroeconomic factors. 
A landmark research by Frank and Goyal (2009) made a major contribution to the 
capital structure determinants literature, resolving the observed problems in prior 
publications. The authors introduce a significantly improved model, including a wide range of 
factors influencing both book and market leverage in listed American non-financial firms 
during the period 1950-2003. In addition to that, different measures of leverage are suggested, 
based on long-term and total debt. However, the researchers put emphasis on the ratio of total 
debt to market value of assets. Focusing on the market definition of leverage, Frank and 
Goyal (2009) find out that a set of six core factors account for more than 27 per cent of the 
variation in leverage. The empirical analysis proves that the most reliable determinants with a 
positive effect on market leverage are median industry leverage, tangibility, log of assets and 
expected inflation. On the other hand, market-to-book assets ratio and profits turn out to have 
strong negative influence on company’s leverage. Additionally, the results indicate that 
dividend-paying companies tend to maintain lower debt levels. As far as book leverage is 
concerned, only industry median leverage, tangibility and profitability remain reliable factors, 
while the effects of market-to-book, firm size and expected inflation turn out to be statistically 
insignificant (Frank and Goyal, 2009). Overall, in the sample of Frank and Goyal (2009) the 
capital structure determinants seem consistent with the predictions, provided by the trade-off 
theory. 
In recent years, most of the literature has paid particular attention to capital structure 
determinants in developing economies and analysis on an industry level (Amidu, 2007; 
Aamir, Gulzar, Uzma, and Aslam Khan, 2013; Alzomaia, 2014; Banerjee and De, 2014; 
Köksal and Orman, 2014; Alipour, Mohammadi and Derakhshan, 2015). For instance, Köksal 
and Orman (2014) conduct a study to investigate the capital structure decisions in Turkish 
non-financial firms during the period 1996-2009, including public and private as well as 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing companies of all size in their sample. To determine the 
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effect on leverage, the authors examine four broad types of variables: firm-specific 
(profitability, tangibility, growth and business risk), tax-related (potential tax shields), 
industry-specific (industry median leverage) and macroeconomic factors (inflation and real 
GDP growth). Their empirical findings indicate that leverage has a positive correlation with 
firm size, potential debt tax shields, industry medial leverage and inflation. On the other hand, 
profitability, business risk and real GDP growth decrease debt levels in the examined non-
financial companies. Generally, Köksal and Orman (2014) conclude that the capital structure 
decisions in their sample are more consistent with the predictions of the trade-off theory than 
the pecking order one.  
2.6. Legal Determinants  
The legal system plays an essential role on the capital market conditions in a particular 
country. To be more specific, La Porta et al. (1997; 1998) estimate that investor and creditor 
protection, ownership concentration and legal enforcement differentiate significantly among 
countries based on their legal origins. Thus, the authors specify two main categories: common 
and civil law countries. The former have their legal origin in English case law and include the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the previous English colonies. The 
latter originates from Roman law and consists of German, Scandinavian and French civil law 
subfamilies. In order to compare the two main law systems, La Porta et al. (1998) construct 
measures such as antidirectors right and creditor protection indexes as well as the quality of 
legal enforcement, including efficiency of judicial system, level of corruption, accounting 
standards, etc. Overall, their results indicate that countries with common law tend to provide 
better shareholder and creditor protection, and stronger legal enforcement in comparison to 
the civil law countries. In addition to that, the former benefit from more liquid and transparent 
capital markets. Civil law countries, on the other hand, provide poorer investor protection and 
thus, have relatively smaller debt and equity markets. Similarly, Fan, Titman and Twite 
(2011) point out that common law countries are associated with better developed capital 
markets, lower leverage and prevailing long-term debt. Regarding bank-oriented countries, 
the researchers conclude that their stronger reliance on the large banking sector determine 
their preference for short-term debt maturity structure (Fan et al. 2011). 
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2.7. Chapter Summary 
Collectively, the studies examined above outline a wide range of factors that 
determine companies’ capital structure decisions. Even though a complete analysis of all 
possible determinants is beyond the scope of our thesis, we examined the most widespread 
capital structure factors. Overall, firm-specific indicators such as tangibility, profitability, firm 
size as well as industry-specific, tax-related and macroeconomic determinants are prevailing 
in the previous research models. Both the trade-off and the pecking order theories have been 
the instrumental bases of identifying such factors. Up to now, a number of studies revealed 
significant support to the trade-off theory, while others provide evidence consistent with the 
pecking order one. Thus, neither of the theories offers a general explanation for the 
companies’ actual financing decisions. In order to solve these conflicts, authors have put 
effort in modifying the existing empirical models and using more representative datasets. 
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3. Methodology 
The current chapter presents the steps used in the data collection process, followed by 
an overview of the constructed sample of renewable energy companies. Then, we introduce 
several measures of leverage, which are later implemented into our empirical model. After 
that, we present the definitions of the examined capital structure determinants, followed by a 
specification of our regression model. Finally, we evaluate its validity and reliability and 
describe possible limitations. 
3.1. Data Collection Method 
The first step of the research process was to collect the renewable energy companies’ 
financial reports in order to calculate the variables, described in the next subsections. Thus, 
we obtained the income statements, balance sheets, cash flow statements and key ratios tables 
for all companies, included in the RENIXX ® Index, for their last ten years of operations. The 
source we used is Thomson Reuters Eikon, which is considered to be highly reliable. 
However, there was missing data for several companies. In these cases, we checked their 
annual reports in order to assure the accuracy of the information. As our research is focused 
on the global renewable energy sector, in order to overcome any possible inconsistencies, all 
financial data was annualized and standardized in US dollars and thousands. Similarly, when 
accumulating market values via Thomson Reuters Datastream, we converted them in US 
dollars and thousands.  
The second method used to identify the reliability of our data involved a check about 
the time coverage of the financial reports. The initial sample consisted of 102 companies, but 
due to data availability limitations we had to exclude some of the entities. Thus, our final 
sample with most existing observations includes 67 companies for the period 2005-2013 (See 
Appendix 1). We consider these companies representative since they have been operating for 
a longer period compared to the 35 excluded. Next, the raw financial data was converted into 
Microsoft Excel in order to calculate the variables for each company on an annual base and 
then, transferred to EViews v8.1 to conduct the panel data regression analysis. 
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3.2. Data Analysis: overview of the examined sample 
The representative sample for the global renewable energy sector consists of 67 of the 
largest companies with more than 50 per cent of revenues coming from this industry 
(Renewable-energy-industry.com, 2015). They operate in various energy generation fields 
such as wind, solar, bioenergy, geothermal and hydropower, but for the purpose of our 
empirical analysis we do not distinguish between these alternative sources and we focus on 
the global scale. However, the entities are geographically spread across both developed and 
developing countries with the majority originating from Germany and the United States (25 
per cent and 24 per cent of the total number of companies, respectively). Additionally, 13 per 
cent of the studied firms originate from other European countries. Around 18 per cent of the 
companies in our sample are registered in tax havens such as the Cayman Islands and 
Bermuda, but operate in China, Europe and North America. 
In order to analyse the impact of different legal systems on capital structure decisions 
in the global renewable energy sector, the sample was divided into two main groups according 
to the classification of La Porta et al. (1997; 1998). Thus, we ended up with the following 
distribution: 60 per cent of the companies are from common law countries and 40 per cent - 
civil law countries (See Appendix 1). The vast majority of the latter (81 per cent) have 
German civil law origin. Regarding access to equity capital markets, most of the included 
companies have been publicly traded for the entire examined period 2005-2013. However, 
there are several firms that have not been listed for the first few studied years. Following the 
geographical and legal overview of our sample, we proceed with introducing the measures of 
leverage, which is the dependent variable in our empirical model. 
3.3. Definitions of Leverage 
Several different measures of leverage have been implemented in previous researches. 
In order to prevent possible biases when focusing on a single definition, we considered nine 
measures of leverage in our empirical tests. Overall, we examined debt with different 
maturities and thus, we distinguished between total, long-term
1
 and short-term leverage, 
broadening the horizon of our research. The major reason to include short-term debt is the fact 
that it also incorporates risk for the financial health of a company (Amidu, 2007; Köksal and 
                                                            
1 Debt with maturity more than 1 year is considered as long-term. 
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Orman, 2014). In addition to maturity, a further differentiation between book and market 
value of assets is implemented. Hence, we consider the following three major groups of 
alternative leverage definitions, based on different denominator in the debt ratios.  
Group 1: Debt to book value of total assets ratios: 1.1) Total leverage: total debt to 
book value of total assets ratio (TL1), 1.2) Long-term leverage: long-term debt to book value 
of total assets ratio (LTL1), 1.3) Short-term leverage: short-term debt to book value of total 
assets ratio (STL1); 
Group 2: Debt to book value of total capital ratios: 2.1) Total leverage: total debt to 
book value of total capital ratio (TL2), 2.2) Long-term leverage: long-term debt to book value 
of total capital ratio (LTL2), 2.3) Short-term leverage: short-term debt to book value of total 
capital ratio (STL2);  
Group 3: Debt to market value of total assets ratios: 3.1) Total leverage: total debt 
to market value of total assets ratio (TL3), 3.2) Long-term leverage: long-term debt to market 
value of total assets ratio (LTL3), 3.3) Short-term leverage: short-term debt to market value of 
total assets ratio (STL3). 
Debt ratios, based on total, long-term or short-term debt over total assets, are 
considered as more appropriate definitions for financial leverage than the definition of total 
liabilities to total assets. The reason behind is that debt ratios act as more accurate indicators 
whether a company could be in a default risk in the near future (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
To be more specific, line items included in total liabilities, such as accounts payable, tend to 
be used for transaction purposes. As a result, any leverage ratio, based on total liabilities, 
would be exaggerated (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Thus, aiming to reflect the capital structure 
and financing decisions of the renewable energy companies more precisely, we calculated the 
alternative measures of leverage including total, long-term and short-term debt in the ratio 
numerator. For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we constructed these ratios using book 
value of debt as a reasonable approximation of its true value (Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 
2010). Moreover, Graham and Harvey (2001) point out that usually, companies do not 
rebalance their positions in response to financial market fluctuations. 
In Group 1, we included debt ratios over book value of total assets. Book value of 
assets is a proxy of assets in place, while market values reflect firm’s growth opportunities 
(Barclay, Morellec and Smith, 2006). However, the latter could not be collateralized and for 
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this reason we consider book values as a more precise indicator of company’s capital 
structure. Furthermore, Myers (1977) emphasizes that managers tend to consider book 
leverage when borrowing decisions are concerned since debt is more reliably supported by 
assets already in place than by future growth opportunities. On the other hand, part of the 
assets could be financed by specific nondebt liabilities, which could impose bias upon our 
inferences. Therefore, in order to overcome any possible drawbacks, in Group 2 we included 
leverage measures with book value of total capital
2
 in the denominator. According to Rajan 
and Zingales (1995), the total debt to total capital ratio reflects the effects of past financing 
decisions to the greatest extent. Furthermore, considering that book values are assumed to be 
backward looking, whilst market values-forward looking, the leverage definitions in Group 3 
are constructed as debt over market value of total assets (Barclay et al. 2006). However, as 
previously stated, due to data availability limitations we were forced to calculate the market 
measures of leverage excluding two years and eight companies, ending up with a sample 59 
renewable energy firms over the period 2007-2013.   
Overall, considering several reliable definitions of leverage enables us to account for 
the influence of the capital structure determinants in a broader setting. Furthermore, the vast 
set of leverage measures allows verifying the consistency of the most significant factors.   
3.4. Definitions of Capital Structure Determinants 
The independent variables in our empirical model are divided into the following major 
groups: firm-specific, industry-specific, tax-related and macroeconomic capital structure 
determinants. As detailed explanation regarding the expected influence of each determinant 
on company’s leverage was already provided in the “Literature Review, 2.5.1.Theoretical 
Predictions”, here we focus only on the implemented factors and how we measure them. 
Table 1 presents the definitions of the included determinants in every group, as well as a 
summary of the factors’ predicted effect on leverage provided by the trade-off and pecking 
order theories. 
 
 
                                                            
2 Total capital is calculated as the sum of total debt and total equity. 
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Table 1. Capital Structure Determinants 
 
The firm specific variables are divided into five measure subgroups: Profitability, 
Size, Nature of Assets, Growth, and Policy and Decision Factor. Profitability is measured as 
operating profit before depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. After that, we 
estimated Size through the natural logarithm of assets, as suggested by Frank and Goyal 
(2009). In our empirical model, we included three different Growth factors: 1) Change in 
natural logarithm of assets; 2) CAPEX divided by assets; 3) Market-to-book assets. The two 
factors that represent the Nature of Assets in our empirical model are: 1) Tangibility, which is 
calculated as fixed assets to total assets ratio, and 2) SG&A Expenses to Revenues. Finally, 
the Policy and Decision Factor, measured as dividends divided by total assets, provides an 
overview of the financial management strategy of a particular company. 
We examined Industry Median Leverage as the major industry-specific determinant. 
To be more precise, we calculated the industry median level for every definition of leverage 
Firm-specific determinants
Profitability Operating Profit to Assets + - -
Log of Assets + + -
Change in Log Assets - - +
CAPEX to Assets - - +
Market-to-book Assets - - +
Tangibility + + -
SG&A Expenses to Revenues - - +
Policy and Decision Factor Dividends to Assets + + -
Industry-specific determinants
Median Industry Leverage + + ?
Listed Firms Dummy ? ? ?
Tax-related determinants
Potential Debt Tax Shield Effective Tax Rate + + ?
Nondebt Tax Shield Depreciation to Assets - - ?
Macroeconomic determinants
Legal Traditions Common Law Dummy ? ? ?
Considered Theories-Predicted effect on leverage
Definition
Static Trade-off 
Theory
Dynamic Trade-
off Theory
Pecking Order 
Theory
Industry Conditions
Growth
Size
Nature of Assets
Determinants
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on annual base. In addition to that, in order to test whether there is a differentiation between 
the capital structure decisions in public and private companies, we incorporated a dummy 
variable (Listed Firm Dummy). This variable takes the value of 1 for listed firms and the 
value of 0 for the non-listed ones. Regarding tax-related variables, we included the following 
two factors: 1) Potential Debt Tax Shield; 2) Nondebt Tax Shield. The proxy for the first 
factor is Effective Tax Rate, measured as taxes paid divided by earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (Taxes Paid/EBITDA). The indicator for Nondebt Tax Shield is 
calculated by dividing depreciation expenses to assets. Regarding the macroeconomic 
variables, the fact the studied companies are geographically spread restricts the consistent 
investigation of factors such as expected inflation and GDP growth. However, we 
implemented a macroeconomic determinant that reflects the different legal systems in the 
country of origin of the examined renewable energy companies. Thus, in order to capture the 
effect of the legal tradition on capital structure decisions, we incorporated a dummy variable 
(Common Law Dummy). Logically, this factor takes the value of 1 when the company 
originates from a common law country, and the value of 0 for a civil law country of origin. 
To clarify, in the models with book value definitions of leverage, book value of assets 
is used when required in the calculation of the variables. Similarly, when the market 
definition of leverage is concerned, we incorporated market value of assets in the relevant 
determinant measures. 
3.5. Model Specification 
As explained in the “3.1.Data Collection Method”, we study 67 renewable energy 
companies for the period 2005-2013, forming an unbalanced data panel3
.
 Most of the previous 
studies in the area have employed a pooled model (Cortez and Susanto, 2012; Alzomaia, 
2014). Even though this model provides a simplistic way of dealing with the complex panel 
data structure, it is associated with several drawbacks: loss of information in the cross-section 
and time-series dimensions, no time-specificity and assumption of no heterogeneity
4
, etc. 
(Brooks, 2008). Thus, in order to benefit from the wide spectra of panel data advantages, we 
utilize the following cross-sectional random effects panel data model
5
:  
                                                            
3 Unbalanced panel: some cross-sectional units, compared to others, have less observations at different times 
(Brooks, 2008).   
4 This suggests that there is no dependence between the observations for the same variable in different periods. 
5 Discussion about model specification tests is presented in the next section: “3.6.Validity and Reliability”. 
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                        ,                 Eq. (1) 
where     is the leverage measure of company   in year  ,   is the common (global) intercept,      is a 
     vector of leverage determinants (firm-specific, industry-specific, tax-related and 
macroeconomic determinants),    is a measure of the “random deviation of each entity’s intercept term 
from the ‘global’ intercept”  (Brooks, 2008, p.498) and     is the error term.  
The empirical analysis is organised as follows. First, through Eq. (1) we investigate 
the influence of the studied factors on the nine different leverage definitions, described in 
“3.2.Definitions of Leverage”, for our full sample. Considering the fact that the global 
financial crisis from 2008 is included in the observed period 2005-2013, we check whether 
the crisis had any effect on the capital structure decisions in the global renewable energy 
sector. Thus, we examine three periods: pre-crisis (2005-2007), crisis (2008-2010) and post-
crisis (2011-2013). In the period breakdown we focus on only one definition of leverage, 
namely Total leverage (TL1)
6 , since a complete analysis of the factors’ influence on all 
alternative definitions of leverage is beyond the scope of our thesis. 
3.6. Validity and Reliability  
The first step in our empirical analysis was to check for potential multicollinearity 
problem amongst the set of determinants incorporated in Eq. (1). Multicollinearity is present 
when there is correlation of |0.80|, or above, between any pair of the explanatory variables 
(Lewis-Beck, 1993). After examining the correlation matrices (See Appendices 2 and 3), we 
concluded that couple-wise correlations are within the interval [-0.40, 0.38] and therefore, 
there is no need of re-specifying any of the determinants or Eq. (1).   
Next, to establish whether there are other relevant problems that could affect the 
consistency of our model and its results, we ran a simple pooled regression without any 
corrections or effects (See Appendix 4). By plotting its residuals (See Figure 1 below), we 
identified that they were systematically either above or below zero, which would imply 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, the variance of the errors across the sample was not constant, 
suggesting heteroscedasticity
7
. The presence of the latter, as Brooks (2008) explains, would 
still result in unbiased coefficient estimates. However, their standard errors could be wrong, 
                                                            
6 Total debt to book value of total assets ratio  
7 Heteroscedasticity is present when the second OLS assumption of error terms having a constant variance is 
violated Brooks (2008).  
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consequently leading to false inferences. Thus, in order to control for heteroscedasticity and 
any potential cross-sectional correlation problems, from there on we used White Robust 
Standard Errors: White cross-section (EViews 8 User's Guide II, 2013).  
  Figure 1. Pooled Regression’s Residual Plot 
 
Source: created by the authors using EViews 8.1  
After having identified the presence of heterogeneity through the use of a graphical 
method, we continued by formally testing for it. This was achieved through estimating Eq. (1) 
with dummy variables for cross-section units
8
 (fixed effects specification) and then running a 
Redundant Fixed Effects-Likelihood Ratio test. If its null hypothesis, stating that the dummy 
variables are jointly zero, is rejected, there would be a sign of significant heterogeneity. The 
following table contains the results of the Redundant Fixed Effects - Likelihood Ratio test: 
Table 2. Redundant Fixed Effects-Likelihood Ratio Results 
 
Source: created by the authors using EViews 8.1. Formatted in Microsoft Excel. 
                                                            
8 Due to EViews 8.1 specifications, we were able to review dummy variables for cross-section units only. 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests
Equation: LEV
Test cross-section fixed effects
Effects Test Statistic  d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 3.26 (297,228) 0.00
Cross-section Chi-square 888.73 297 0.00
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As it could be seen from the p-values, cross-section dummies are highly significant, 
implying that heterogeneity should be accounted for in the cross-section dimension.  
The final matter covered in this section concerns the choice of panel data model 
specification. Brooks (2008) summarizes that in general the random effects model provides 
more efficient estimation in comparison to the fixed effects approach. On the other hand, the 
author continues by arguing that the random effects model has a very strict assumption of 
   and     not being correlated with any of the explanatory variables. The Correlated Random 
Effects - Hausman Test in EViews 8.1 tests whether this assumption holds. Unfortunately, 
two-way random effects (or a mix between random and fixed effects) for unbalanced panel 
data are not supported by the software. Thus, we ran the Hausman test for cross-section 
random effects only. Brooks (2008) sums up that if the p-value for the test is above 1 per cent, 
the null hypothesis that the random effects model is well-specified cannot be rejected. In our 
case, the Hausman test results
9
 indicate that the random effects model is well-specified and 
thus, we could use it in order to control for heterogeneity in the cross-section dimension.  
3.7. Limitations 
The main limitation in our research method concerns data availability. To be more 
specific, we were forced to exclude R&D Expenses to Revenues ratio as a firm-specific 
determinant since a significant number of companies do not report their R&D expenses 
separately. In addition to that, as previously stated, we faced data limitation problems 
regarding the market value estimations, resulting in the exclusion of eight companies and two 
years. Thus, the number of observations in the market value regressions fell from 536 to 412.    
3.8. Chapter Summary 
The chapter outlined the process of data collection, data analysis and construction of 
our empirical model. To start with, we built our sample of 67 renewable energy companies, 
part of the RENIXX ® Index, by using financial data from Thomson Reuters Eikon and 
Datastream for the period 2005-2013. Overall, the majority of the examined companies 
originate from Germany and the United States. Furthermore, 60 per cent of all studied firms 
operate in common law countries. In order to obtain a better picture of the relationship 
                                                            
9 Hausman test p-values are included as a subsection in the relevant regression results tables. 
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between capital structure and its determinants, we introduced nine alternative definitions of 
leverage, which is the dependable variable in our empirical model. They are classified in three 
major groups: Debt to book value of total assets ratios, Debt to book value of total capital 
ratios, and Debt to market value of total assets ratios. After that, we presented the measures of 
our model’s independent variables, divided into firm-specific, industry-specific, tax-related 
and macroeconomic capital structure determinants. Regarding the empirical analysis, we 
implemented a cross-sectional random effects panel data model. Generally, the main focus of 
our empirical research is to test the influence of the capital structure determinants on all 
alternative definitions of leverage in our full sample. Additionally, in order to check whether 
the global financial crisis had any effect on the financing decisions in the studied sector, we 
divided our sample into three sub-periods, namely pre-crisis (2005-2007), crisis (2008-2010) 
and post-crisis (2011-2013). The results of the period breakdown could also serve as a 
robustness check of the consistency of our findings regarding the capital structure 
determinants in our full sample. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables. 
As previously mentioned in the Methodology section, we study three different leverage 
groups. However, since the same pattern in their descriptive statistics is observed, we focus 
the following analysis on leverage definition Group 1 (Total debt to book value of assets; 
Long-term debt to book value of assets; Short-term debt to book value of assets). According 
to Table 3, mean total debt ratio is 22.2 per cent and its median is 16.4 per cent; mean long-
term debt ratio is 13.9 per cent and its median is 6.8 per cent, and mean short-term ratio is 8.3 
per cent and its median is 3.5 per cent. From these results, we can conclude that the studied 
companies from the global renewable energy sector rely on equity as a main source of 
financing. Furthermore, long-term debt is preferred, being approximately twice as much as 
short-term debt.  
Other informative results from Table 3 are concerned with firm-specific and tax-
related determinants. For clarity and simplicity, in Table 3 all determinants, except for 
market-to-book assets, are based on book value of assets. The motivation behind this decision 
lies in the fact that the descriptive statistics of the factors, calculated with market value of 
assets (See Appendix 5), do not appear significantly different from those presented in Table 3. 
Moving on to the analysis, mean Profitability is -1.2 per cent and its median is 4.9 per cent, 
signalling that on average the studied renewable energy companies experience negative 
operating income before taxes. Regarding Growth determinants, Change in Log Assets, with 
mean of 2.3 per cent, and CAPEX to Assets ratio, with mean of 7.5 per cent, are based on 
book value of assets and present the average historical expansion in the sector. On the other 
hand, Market-to-book Assets ratio, with mean of 152.9 per cent, incorporates market value of 
assets, and is indicative of the high market expectations about the future prospects of the 
global renewable energy industry (Frank and Goyal, 2009). 
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      Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Observations
Debt Ratios Definition
Total Debt to Book Value of Assets 603 0.22 0.16 1.10 0.00 0.21 72.89 0.00
Total Debt to Book Value of Total Capital 603 0.27 0.25 7.24 -22.22 1.00 4718722.00 0.00
Total Debt to Market Value of Assets 413 0.21 0.13 0.84 0.00 0.21 52.67 0.00
Long-term Debt to Book Value of Assets 603 0.14 0.07 0.65 0.00 0.17 140.41 0.00
Long-term Debt to Book Value of Total Capital 603 0.19 0.10 0.98 -0.08 0.22 115.07 0.00
Long-term Debt to Market Value of Assets 413 0.15 0.07 0.75 0.00 0.18 99.28 0.00
Short-term Debt to Book Value of Assets 603 0.08 0.03 1.02 0.00 0.13 4808.30 0.00
Short-term Debt to Book Value of Total Capital 603 0.08 0.05 7.24 -22.22 0.97 5647686.00 0.00
Short-term Debt to Market Value of Assets 413 0.07 0.02 0.57 0.00 0.10 791.34 0.00
Firm-specific determinants
Profitability Operating Profit to Assets 603 -0.01 0.05 1.48 -6.14 0.38 365045.9 0.00
Size Log of Assets 603 12.61 12.64 16.69 5.28 1.99 17.04951 0.00
Change in Log Assets 536 0.02 0.01 0.77 -0.10 0.07 40271.84 0.00
CAPEX to Assets 603 0.08 0.05 0.83 -0.47 0.11 3822.892 0.00
Market-to-book Assets 413 1.53 1.10 15.51 -19.49 1.85 47458.01 0.00
Tangibility 603 0.29 0.23 0.99 0.00 0.24 62.06685 0.00
SG&A Expenses to Revenues 603 0.68 0.14 33.73 0.00 2.37 189587.2 0.00
Policy and Decision factor Dividends to Assets 603 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.02 461858.7 0.00
Industry-specific determinants
Median Industry Leverage 603 0.17 0.15 0.30 0.09 0.07 69.00 0.00
Listed Firms Dummy 603 0.89 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.32 1003.42 0.00
Tax-related determinants
Potential Debt Tax Shield Effective Tax Rate 603 0.10 0.05 5.16 -9.65 0.63 277804.90 0.00
Nondebt Tax Shield Depreciation to Assets 603 0.03 0.03 0.73 -0.01 0.06 126706.10 0.00
Macroeconomic determinants
Legal traditions Common Law Dummy 603 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.49 101.12 0.00
Growth
Nature of Assets
Industry Conditions
Jarque-Bera
 JB P -value
Total Leverage
Long-term Leverage
Short-term Leverage
Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Standard 
Deviation
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Concerning the Nature of Assets determinants, the mean score for Tangibility is 29.0 
per cent and its median is 22.7 per cent. It is interesting to note that neither of the leverage 
definitions have a mean higher than the average tangibility (Total debt to book value of total 
capital’s mean of 26.7 per cent is close, but still below 29). Due to the riskiness and long-term 
orientation of the renewable energy sector, the ratio of fixed assets to total assets could be 
seen as a ceiling, restraining the maximum leverage level that a company could have. If that is 
considered true, then the question why the firms in our sample under-utilize debt financing 
becomes relevant. However, earlier we concluded that the studied companies have on average 
negative operating income before taxes. Therefore, any tax-shields provided from higher debt 
levels would add no value, while the bankruptcy and distress costs would increase. The other 
determinant in the Nature of Assets group is SG&A Expenses to Revenues. From its mean of 
67.7 per cent it can be concluded that the SG&A expenses offset a large portion of the 
revenues of the analyzed companies. According to the “Global Trends in Renewable Energy 
Investment 2014” report, the high costs, which explicitly characterize the renewable energy 
sector, are one of the reasons for the weak investment activity in the industry during the 
period 2009 - 2014 (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, 2014).  
The last factor requiring attention is Effective Tax Rate, part of the tax-related 
determinants. Its mean and median are 9.9 per cent and 5.1 per cent, respectively. At first 
sight, these results seem considerably low, especially when compared to the corporate tax 
rates in most of the countries of origin of the studied companies (See Appendix 1). Alipour et 
al. (2015) find out that companies face declining effective corporate tax rate the higher their 
long-term debt is. It could be inferred that due to low profitability, the analyzed renewable 
energy companies do not need to employ huge amount of long-term debt in order to greatly 
reduce their tax burden. Another possible explanation could be found in the fact that twelve 
companies from our sample (18 per cent) are registered in tax heavens, such as the Cayman 
Islands and Bermuda, where the tax rate is 0 per cent, and thus, bringing down the mean value 
for the Effective Tax Rate. 
Table 3 also reports the Jarque-Bera test statistic and its related p-values. The Jarque-
Bera test is informative for the distributional properties of the data and considers its 
skewness
10
 and kurtosis
11
. The null hypothesis of the test is of normality and is not rejected if 
                                                            
10 The skewness measures the extent to which a distribution is not symmetric about its mean value (Brooks, 
2008) 
11 The kurtosis measures how fat the tails of the distribution are (Brooks, 2008) 
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the p-values are bigger than 0.01. As it can be seen from Table 3, that is not the case with our 
data. However, since we consider our dataset to be sufficiently large, the consequences of 
normality violation are insignificant (Brooks, 2008).  
4.2. Regression Results 
4.2.1. Full Sample  
The results obtained from estimating Eq. (1) for the three leverage groups are 
summarised in Table 4. This table reveals that the models for total leverage and long-term 
leverage have considerably higher explanatory power (R-squared) compared to the short-term 
leverage ones, signalling that short-term financing decisions are influenced by a wider range 
of factors. Furthermore, all regression tests have an F-statistic p-value of 0.00, and therefore 
rejecting the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are equal to zero. After pointing out the 
main characteristics of the regression model under its different leverage specifications, the 
subsequent analysis covers the results for each determinant group. 
Firm-specific determinants 
The results in Table 4 indicate that Profitability has a negative relationship with all 
leverage definitions, except for STL3. It is interesting to note that the determinant is 
significant throughout the whole Group 1. Concerning Group 2, Profitability is significant 
only regarding total leverage and long-term leverage. In Group 3, Profitability does not appear 
to be a relevant capital structure determinant. Overall, these results indicate that more 
profitable firms would have lower leverage levels, which is consistent with the dynamic trade-
off and pecking order theories. 
With respect to Firm Size, Table 4 shows a positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level association with total leverage and long-term leverage from all three groups. Concerning 
short-term leverage, its relationship with Size is positive and significant in Group 1, positive 
and not significant in Group 2, and negative and irrelevant in Group 3. Our findings suggest 
that the bigger a renewable energy company is, the larger its long-term and total debt are, 
which is in line with the trade-off theory.   
Growth is studied with the help of three different determinants. The first one is 
Change in Log Assets, which was implemented in Group 1 and Group 2 only. Interestingly, 
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the same pattern in the coefficient signs is observed between these two groups: Change in Log 
Assets has a negative relationship with total leverage and short-term leverage, and a positive 
one with long-term leverage. In relevance terms, the determinant is significant for the two 
short-term leverage specifications and LTL1 and TL2. Another Growth determinant is CAPEX 
to Assets. According to our findings, the latter has an overall negative and insignificant 
relation with leverage. The last determinant, discussed in this section, is Market-to-book 
Assets. Since it is based on market value of total assets, it is utilized only in Group 3. The 
Market-to-book Assets variable appears to be significantly negative in all leverage equations 
from Group 3. Even though that all three Growth determinants are measured differently, they 
share the same pattern, more precisely being that firms with higher past growth and expected 
future expansion have less leverage. These results are consistent with the trade-off theory. 
The next set of determinants considers Nature of Assets. Its first representative is 
Tangibility. The results presented in Table 4 indicate that Tangibility has a positive and 
significant at the 1 per cent level relation with total leverage and long-term leverage from all 
three groups. Regarding short-term leverage, the discussed determinant is not relevant and has 
a positive sign for STL1 and STL3, and a negative for STL2. Tangibility has the highest 
average coefficient value in absolute terms amongst all significant coefficients, which is 
informative for the strong economical significance of the factor. The above stated results 
indicate that firms with more fixed assets tend to employ more long-term than short-term 
debt. These results are in line with the predictions of the trade-off theory. 
Moving on to SG&A Expenses to Revenues, also part of the Nature of Assets group, 
Table 4 shows an overall negative and highly significant association with leverage. The 
intuition behind these results implies that companies with higher SG&A expenses would have 
lower available cash flows, and therefore lower leverage. These findings are in line with the 
trade-off theory. 
The last firm-specific determinant is the Policy and Decision factor, measured by the 
ratio Dividends to Assets. The results, as shown in Table 4, reveal that the latter has a 
negative relationship with all studied leverage specifications, meaning that high dividend 
paying firms have lower leverage. Concerning its relevance, Dividends to Assets appears 
statistically and economically significant in the relation with total leverage and short-term 
leverage from Group 2 and Group 3. Overall, these results are supported by the pecking order 
theory.  
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Table 4. Regression Analysis: Full Sample
Period: 
Leverage Denominator: 
TL1 LTL1 STL1 TL2 LTL2 STL2 TL3 LTL3 STL3
Firm-specific determinants Measure
Profitability Operating Profit to Assets -0.085*** -0.040** -0.038* -0.113** -0.043* -0.078 -0.004 -0.001 0.000
0.025 0.020 0.021 0.050 0.023 0.048 0.047 0.036 0.014
Size Log of Assets 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.007*** 0.029** 0.031*** 0.002 0.017*** 0.020*** -0.001
0.003 0.003 0.002 0.014 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.003
Growth Change in Log Assets -0.050 0.082* -0.104*** -0.194** 0.085 -0.179** - - -
0.059 0.049 0.035 0.087 0.075 0.081 - - -
CAPEX to Assets -0.141 -0.108 -0.024 -0.228 -0.131 -0.132 -0.008 -0.072 0.067
0.098 0.079 0.048 0.144 0.096 0.097 0.104 0.073 0.047
Market-to-book Assets - - - - - - -0.011*** -0.004*** -0.006*
- - - - - - 0.004 0.001 0.003
Nature of Assets Tangibility 0.399*** 0.389*** 0.018 0.389*** 0.429*** -0.075 0.425*** 0.417*** 0.023
0.041 0.025 0.023 0.070 0.028 0.048 0.031 0.018 0.015
SG&A Expenses to Revenues -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.012*** -0.003*** -0.008*** -0.012* -0.004 -0.008***
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.002
Policy and Decision factor Dividends to Assets -0.251 -0.081 -0.185 -0.535* -0.220 -0.632* -0.404** -0.039 -0.308*
0.166 0.127 0.120 0.298 0.161 0.374 0.160 0.056 0.158
Industry-specific determinants
Industry Conditions Median Industry Leverage 0.376*** 0.170** 0.216*** 0.662*** 0.316*** 0.398*** 0.480*** 0.192*** 0.284***
0.069 0.067 0.038 0.149 0.108 0.044 0.099 0.053 0.072
Listed Firms dummy -0.196*** -0.078*** -0.118*** -0.206*** -0.101*** -0.072 - - -
0.027 0.007 0.021 0.065 0.012 0.050 - - -
Tax-related determinants
Potential Debt Tax Shield Effective Tax Rate -0.017* -0.011 -0.005 -0.021 -0.012 0.002 -0.007 -0.013 0.004
0.009 0.013 0.007 0.017 0.018 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.006
Nondebt Tax Shield Depreciation to Assets -0.010 -0.106 0.082 0.267*** -0.190 0.522** 0.078 -0.007 0.035
0.056 0.088 0.089 0.074 0.133 0.203 0.069 0.047 0.087
Macroeconomic determinants
Legal traditions Common Law Dummy -0.010 -0.043*** 0.029*** 0.007 -0.058*** 0.066 -0.017*** -0.029** 0.011*
0.010 0.012 0.008 0.042 0.019 0.042 0.006 0.012 0.007
Number of observations 536 536 536 536 536 536 412 412 412
Number of firms 67 67 67 67 67 67 59 59 59
R -squared 0.380 0.403 0.118 0.228 0.354 0.102 0.479 0.518 0.120
Adjusted R-squared 0.366 0.389 0.098 0.210 0.339 0.082 0.465 0.505 0.096
0.634 0.041 0.012 0.459 0.021 0.408 0.077 0.046 0.016
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
2007 - 2013
Total 
Leverage
Long-term 
Leverage
Book Value of Total Assets
Total 
Leverage
2005 - 2013 2005 - 2013
Short-term 
Leverage
Market Value of Total Assets
Long-term 
Leverage
Book Value of Total Capital
Total 
Leverage
Short-term 
Leverage
Short-term 
Leverage
This table summarizes the results from estimating our random effects panel regression Eq. (1). The determinants are the same as those defined in Table 1. All results are reported in three decimal 
places. Two results are reported for each determinant: on top, coefficient value; below, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors.
***, **, and * Significance levels at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively
Leverage definition: 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Long-term 
Leverage
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Industry-specific determinants 
The first factor from the industry-specific group of determinants is Median Industry 
Leverage, which is positively and significantly related to all studied leverage groups. These 
results are in line with the postulates of the trade-off theory. The second variable from this 
group is Listed Firms Dummy, which was incorporated in the equations for Group 1 and 
Group 2 only. According to our results, the dummy always appear to have a negative and 
highly significant, except for STL2, association with leverage. What can be inferred from 
these findings is that listed renewable energy companies tend to have lower leverage in 
comparison to the private ones, signalling that equity markets provide an efficient alternative 
to debt financing. Judging by the overall coefficient size of both industry-specific 
determinants, it can be concluded that they are not only statistically but also economically 
significant. 
Tax-related determinants 
Table 4 highlights that Potential Debt Tax Shield, measured through Effective Tax 
Rate, have an overall insignificant relationship with leverage. Coefficient sign wise, the 
determinant is negative in all total and long-term leverage equations, while STL1 is negative, 
and STL2 and STL3 are positive. Regarding Nondebt Tax Shield, calculated by the ratio of 
Depreciation to Assets, we arrive at mixed results. The only identifiable trend lays in the 
positive coefficient sign in all three short-term leverage equations, and the negative one in all 
long-term debt ratios. In general, this factor is insignificant. The results for both tax-related 
determinants are neither supported by the trade-off theory nor the pecking order one.  
Macroeconomic determinants 
The last group of determinants considers the Legal Traditions and is based on a 
Common Law Dummy. In all three leverage groups, Legal Traditions appear to have a 
negative and significant association with long-term leverage, and a positive and significant, 
except for STL2, relation with short-term leverage. In the long-term debt ratio equations, TL3 
has a negative coefficient and is significant at the 1 per cent level, while TL2 and TL1 are 
insignificant. A discussion about these findings is presented in “4.3.Discussion”.  
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4.2.2. Period Breakdown 
Table 5 illustrates the regression results from estimating Eq. (1) for the three periods, 
namely, 2005-2007 (pre-crisis), 2008-2010 (crisis), and 2011-2013 (post-crisis). In this case, 
as explained in the Methodology, we focus only on one leverage definition: Total debt to 
book value of total assets, and any comparison with Table 4 results is based on it. Table 5 
provides interesting results in regards to the explanatory power (R-squared) of the model for 
three periods. The model does “best” (with R-squared of 0.483) when applied to the pre-crisis 
period. However, the explanatory power of the model is substantially lower for the crisis (R-
squared of 0.256) and post-crisis (R-squared of 0.304) periods, hinting that a broader range of 
factors should be considered. In addition, the F-statistic p-value for all three subsamples is 
0.00 again. Finally, due to software specifications, the pre-crisis period has 134 observations, 
while the other two: 201 observations. 
Firm-specific determinants 
The results displayed in Table 5 reveal that there is a negative relationship between 
Profitability and total leverage in all three periods. In terms of relevance, Profitability appears 
significant only in the pre-crisis period. The next firm-specific determinant is Size, defined as 
Log of Assets. The latter, according to the figures in Table 5, is positively associated with 
total leverage and significant at the 1 per cent level in the crisis and post-crisis periods. With 
respect to Growth, the coefficient of Change in Log Assets is not relevant and has a negative 
relation with leverage pre-crisis and positive during and post-crisis. Regarding CAPEX to 
Assets, the results from Table 5 indicate that it has a negative relationship with leverage, 
which is significant only in the pre-crisis period.  The next set of determinants considers the 
Nature of Assets. Tangibility, again, appears to be statistically and economically significant 
and positively correlated with leverage in all three periods. Concerning SG&A Expenses to 
Revenues, it has a negative relationship with leverage, while only insignificant in the post-
crisis subsample. The last determinant from the firm-specific group is Dividends to Assets, 
which is again both statistically and economically significant, and negatively associated with 
leverage for all periods. Overall, only Change in Log Assets differentiates from our findings 
for the firm-specific determinants in the full sample. 
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Table 5. Regression Analysis: Period Breakdown 
Period: 
Leverage Denominator: 
Firm-specific determinants Measure
Profitability Operating Profit to Assets -0.017*** -0.019 -0.027
0.005 0.048 0.037
Size Log of Assets 0.003 0.028*** 0.021***
0.004 0.001 0.003
Growth Change in Log Assets -0.043 0.152 0.586
0.043 0.170 0.507
CAPEX to Assets -0.277*** -0.062 -0.034
0.081 0.127 0.052
Market-to-book Assets - - -
- - -
Nature of Assets Tangibility 0.701*** 0.276*** 0.417***
0.064 0.054 0.013
SG&A Expenses to Revenues -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.003
0.001 0.001 0.004
Policy and Decision factor Dividends to Assets -0.346** -0.223* -1.554***
0.139 0.120 0.588
Industry-specific determinants
Industry Conditions Median Industry Leverage -2.108*** -0.176 0.778***
0.239 0.196 0.068
Listed Firms dummy -0.189*** 0.008 -0.051*
0.022 0.051 0.027
Tax-related determinants
Potential Debt Tax Shield Effective Tax Rate -0.011* -0.012 -0.021
0.006 0.009 0.034
Nondebt Tax Shield Depreciation to Assets -1.063*** 0.413 -0.101**
0.121 0.536 0.045
Macroeconomic determinants
Legal traditions Common Law Dummy -0.056*** -0.023* -0.031**
0.000 0.013 0.012
Number of observations 134 201 201
Number of firms 67 67 67
R -squared 0.483 0.256 0.304
Adjusted R-squared 0.432 0.209 0.259
0.101 0.919 0.106
2005 - 2007 (Pre-Crisis) 2008 - 2010 (Crisis) 2011 - 2013 (Post-Crisis)
***, **, and * Significance levels at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively
Book Value of Total Assets Book Value of Total Assets Book Value of Total Assets
Total 
Leverage
This table summarizes the results from estimating our random effects panel regression Eq. (1). However, the sample is divided into three different 
subperiods. The determinants are the same as those defined in Table 1. All results are reported in three decimal places. Two results are reported for each 
determinant: on top, coefficient value; below, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation robust standard errors.
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test
Leverage definition: 
Total 
Leverage
Total 
Leverage
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Industry-specific determinants 
The industry-specific determinants show mixed findings. The results from Table 5 
indicate that Median Industry Leverage is significant only in the pre- and post-crisis 
subsamples. Furthermore, we conclude that while the variable has a negative relationship with 
leverage pre- and during the crisis, the coefficient becomes positive in the post-crisis period. 
The next determinant of this group is Listed Firms Dummy. In terms of significance, the latter 
follows the same pattern as the Median Industry Leverage. However, the coefficient has a 
negative association with leverage pre- and post-crisis, and a positive one during the crisis. To 
conclude, we fail to identify resemblance between the results for the full sample and the three 
periods and overall, there is no support by either of the discussed theories. 
 Tax-related determinants 
The first determinant from this group is Effective Tax Rate, which shows an overall 
negative and insignificant relation with leverage. However, this is in line with the full sample 
results. That is not that case with the Depreciation to Assets factor. Its coefficient is negative 
and significant in the pre- and post-crisis periods. On the contrary, during the crisis 
Depreciation to Assets has a positive and irrelevant relationship with leverage. Overall, the 
coefficient of Depreciation to Assets is consistent with the predictions of the trade-off theory, 
which is not the case in the full sample results. 
Macroeconomic determinants 
As discussed before, the only representative from this group is the Common Law 
Dummy. The results from Table 5 show that the latter has a negative and significant 
association with leverage, which does not contradict the findings from the full sample 
estimation. 
4.3. Discussion 
4.3.1. Analysis of the Regression Results 
This study set out with the aim of assessing the importance of various factors which 
influence capital structure decisions in the global renewable energy sector. In the process of 
achieving this goal, we also indentified certain trends related to the capital structure itself, 
which are briefly commented in the rest of this paragraph. The descriptive statistics reveal a 
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very interesting finding in terms of the choice of financing alternatives. In all three leverage 
definition groups, long-term debt is preferred to short-term debt, with the former being around 
two thirds of total debt. However, the average total leverage is not higher than 27 per cent, 
implying that equity is the prevailing source of funds for the studied renewable energy 
companies. These findings are in line with Sonntag-O’Brien and Usher (2004) research in 
which they emphasize that renewable energy technologies are associated with long 
timeframes and high uncertainty, leaving most short-term investors out of play. Further 
support could be obtained from EY (2014) report, in which it is stated that prior 2014 the 
renewable energy green bond market was not well suited to provide debt funding. The authors 
explain that the key reasons for this were the unproven technology and the sector being 
relatively young with investors lacking understanding of its business risk.  
Moving on to the main purpose of this paper, the following discussion centres on the 
capital structure determinants. The focus is on the overall trends outlined from the analysis of 
the full sample and period breakdown results. Nevertheless, a few individual findings deserve 
attention and are therefore discussed separately. Beginning with Profitability, our results 
indicate an overall negative and significant relationship with leverage. This outcome is 
consistent with the results of Myers and Majluf (1984), Kester (1986), Titman and Wessels 
(1988) and Fama and French (2002). Moreover, the recent researches of Hennessy and 
Whited (2005), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007), Strebulaev (2007) and Kayhan and Titman 
(2007) also support the fact that profitable companies maintain lower debt ratios.  
Consistent with the empirical findings of Warner (1977), Titman and Wessels (1988), 
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and De Jong et al. (2008), our results show a positive and 
significant association between Firm Size and leverage. An explanation of this finding could 
be that larger firms are more stable and have lower probability of default, and therefore, can 
sustain more debt. Observing the results from the period breakdown, it is interesting to note 
that in the pre-crisis subsample Firm Size is not a relevant factor. However, during and post-
crisis the latter becomes significant at the 1 per cent level. A possible explanation of this 
might be that since the crisis created a very turbulent market environment, bond holders and 
other types of lenders felt more secure investing their money into big companies, which enjoy 
the perks of lower volatility and decreased information asymmetry (Ogden et al. 2003). 
Regarding firm growth, as previously explained, we use three different determinants. 
The overall results indicate a negative relationship of all three growth factors and leverage. 
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However, only Market-to-book Assets appear to be significant. The intuition behind these 
findings is that firms of fast growth are normally expected to accumulate enough internal 
funds in order to sustain their expansion without having to rely on external financing. These 
results are in agreement with those of Rajan and Zingales, (1995), Frank and Goyal (2009), 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Hovakimian (2006).  
Moving forward to the next firm-specific determinant, our findings indicate a positive 
and significant at the 1 per cent level association between Tangibility and total and long-term 
leverages. However, our results imply that Tangibility is insignificant for all three short-term 
leverage definitions suggesting that the studied renewable energy companies match the 
maturity of their assets with their debt. These findings are in line with Harris and Raviv 
(1991), Rajan and Zingales, (1995), Köksal and Orman (2014) and Amidu (2007). 
Considering the period breakdown, we arrive at a surprising result regarding the absolute 
coefficient value of the Tangibility variable. It fell from 0.701 pre-crisis to 0.276 during the 
crisis, marking a drop of 60.6 per cent. These results are rather puzzling and in clear 
contradiction with the findings of Harrison and Widjaja (2014). In their study, the two authors 
observe that the coefficient of tangibility undergoes a significant increase of 40 per cent 
during the crisis, raising the influence of this determinant in leverage decisions due to its 
capacity to diminish adverse selection problems. 
The subsequent discussion in this paragraph is dedicated to the two determinants with 
the most consistent results amongst all twelve regressions that we ran. The first one is SG&A 
Expenses to Revenues, which according to our results, has a negative and highly significant 
relationship with leverage. The logic behind this finding is that companies with higher 
expenses would have lower available cash flows, which on the other hand, would not be able 
to support the costs of higher debt levels. These results are in accord with Long and Malitz 
(1985) and Frank and Goyal (2009). The second robust coefficient is Dividends to Assets. It 
has a negative and overall significant
12
 association with leverage. The intuition here is the 
same as the one for SG&A Expenses to Revenues. It is interesting to mention that the 
determinant Dividends to Assets in the post-crisis sample is significant at the 1 per cent level 
and with the second highest coefficient value of 1.554 in absolute terms from all regression 
results. A possible explanation for this might be that the dividend paying renewable energy 
                                                            
12 The coefficient of Dividends to Assets is significant in 4 out of 9 cases for the full period sample and 3 out 3 
for the period breakdown. Since the results from the period breakdown appear quite robust, our overall judgment 
is that the determinant is significant. 
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companies from our sample increased their dividends after the crisis in order to attract long-
term investors such as pension and insurance funds. By doing so, the equity of the studied 
firms increased leading to lower leverage levels. Finally, the results for the Dividends to 
Assets determinant are consistent with Myers (1984) and Frank and Goyal (2009). 
The next group of determinants considers industry-specific conditions. Median 
Industry Leverage appears to be significant and positively associated with leverage, 
suggesting that the studied renewable energy companies follow target adjustment behaviour in 
their leverage decisions. Furthermore, it could be inferred that these firms employ less debt in 
comparison to the median industry level. Our results are in agreement with previous research 
of Schwartz and Aronson (1967) and Bradley et al. (1984).  Of particular interest are the 
period breakdown findings. In the pre-crisis period, the coefficient of the Median Industry 
Leverage is significant and negative, having the highest of all absolute values of |-2.108|. It 
may be that before the crisis, some of the studied renewable energy companies were highly 
levered, being way above the industry median. In the crisis sample, this determinant looses 
relevance, but is still negatively related to leverage. A sign of change is then found in the 
post-crisis period, where Median Industry Leverage is highly significant again, but with 
positive coefficient of 0.778. A possible inference could be that in order to fight the adverse 
impact of the crisis, the studied renewable energy companies had to substantially reduce their 
debt levels, arriving at a lower than the industry level leverage ratio. The second and last 
factor from the industry-specific group is Listed Firms Dummy. The results indicate a 
significant and negative relationship with leverage, implying that listed companies have an 
efficient substitute of debt in the representation of equity. These findings are in line with 
Helwege and Liang (1996), but somewhat against those of Myers (1984). 
Considering the tax-related determinants, our results suggest an overall negative 
relationship between Effective Tax Rate and leverage. However, the factor lacks statistical 
significance in 83.3 per cent of the cases. A probable reason for this could lie in the fact that 
18 per cent of the companies in our sample are unaffected by corporate taxation. Our findings 
are in agreement with the empirical evidence from recent studies by Antoniou, Guney and 
Paudyal (2008) and Karadeniz et al. (2009). Concerning Depreciation to Assets, this study has 
been unable to demonstrate any prevailing significance and coefficient sign trends.  
The final paragraph of this section considers the macroeconomic determinant, 
represented by the Common Law Dummy. Overall, the factor appears to be significantly and 
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negatively related to total and long-term leverage. These results indicate that the studied 
renewable energy companies operating under common law traditions tend to have lower total 
leverage, which is consistent with Fan et al. (2011). On the other hand, our findings for long- 
and short-term debt are in clear contradiction with Fan et al. (2011) and Baker and Martin 
(2011). It is difficult to explain these results, but they might be related to the fact that during 
the studied period the renewable energy companies were not yet established on the market 
and were associated with high business risks, altering the behaviour of different lenders. 
4.3.2. Trade-off or Pecking Order? 
The second question in this study seeks to determine which of the two theories, trade-
off or pecking order, explains the findings of our study better. Table 6 summarizes the 
theoretical factor predictions alongside with our empirical results.  
There are only two determinants from our study, which follow the factor predictions of 
the Pecking order theory, and they appear quite robust.  The first one is Profitability, with 
eleven out of twelve coefficients being negative, and the second one is Dividends to Assets, 
which has a robust negative association with leverage in all observed regressions. However, 
the dynamic trade-off theory also predicts a negative relationship between profitability and 
leverage, as explained by Frank and Goyal (2008), which adds even more explanatory power 
to the trade-off framework.  
Overall, we find that the dynamic trade-off theory describes the capital structure 
decisions in the studied renewable energy companies better. It is interesting to note that this 
trend is also present in the full sample and period breakdown results separately (See 
Appendices 6 and 7). To our knowledge, there are no previous studies examining the 
applicability of either of the discussed theories to the capital structure decisions in the 
renewable energy sector. Therefore, our result could be seen as a solid foundation prompting 
future research. 
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Table 6. Comparison of Theoretical Predictions with Data Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm-specific determinants
Profitability Operating Profit to Assets + - - -
Log of Assets + + - +
Change in Log Assets - - + -
CAPEX to Assets - - + -
Market-to-book Assets - - + -
Tangibility + + - +
SG&A Expenses to Revenues - - + -
Policy and Decision Factor Dividends to Assets + + - -
Industry-specific determinants
Median Industry Leverage + + ? +
Listed Firms Dummy ? ? ? -
Tax-related determinants
Potential Debt Tax Shields Effective Tax Rate + + ? -
Nondebt Tax Shield Depreciation to Assets - - ? +/-
Macroeconomic determinants
Legal Traditions Common Law Dummy ? ? ? -
Size
Growth
Nature of Assets
Industry Conditions
Data
Determinants Definition
Static Trade-off 
Theory
Dynamic Trade-
off Theory
Pecking Order 
Theory
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5.Conclusion 
The present paper was designed to determine the factors that significantly influence 
capital structure decisions in the global renewable energy sector, where the topic has been 
under-researched. Our study was inspired by a combination of the raising importance of 
sustainability on a global scale and the high relevance of capital structure decisions for the 
survivability of companies in the context of the financial crisis 2008.  
The study was based on a sample of 67 renewable energy companies for the period 
2005-2013. Our data was analyzed using a panel data model, in which leverage was the 
dependent variable, controlled by a set of firm-specific, industry-specific, tax-related and 
macroeconomic independent variables. To add further depth to our research, and to confirm 
the robustness of our results, several definitions of leverage were implemented.  A novelty of 
our paper comes from the fact that we incorporated a legal traditions variable that enabled us 
to investigate whether the legal origin has any impact on firm’s financing decisions. In 
addition to examining the entire sample period, we divided our data into three sub-periods: 
2005-2007 (pre-crisis), 2008-2010 (crisis), and 2011-2013 (post-crisis), with the aim to 
unearth if the financial crisis had any influence on the association between leverage and its 
determining factors. Finally, we performed a comparative test of the pecking order theory and 
the trade-off theory in order to find out which framework provided a better explanation of our 
results.  
The evidence from this study suggests that the prevailing source of funds for the 
studied renewable energy companies is equity. Moreover, long-term debt is preferred to short-
term debt, with the former being approximately two thirds of total debt. Interestingly, we find 
that on average the studied companies experience negative operating income before taxes. 
Therefore, employing additional debt would not add any further value in the form of tax 
shields, but would increase the financial distress and bankruptcy costs. On the whole, these 
results are in line with previous researches, stating that the renewable energy sector is long-
term oriented and associated with high business risks.  
Our regression analysis reveals that the determinants which are positively and 
significantly correlated with leverage are Size, Tangibility and Median Industry Leverage. 
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Considering Size, we conclude that large renewable energy firms are more stable and less 
likely to go bankrupt, thus being able to support higher debt levels. In general, our results for 
Tangibility confirm that the studied companies match the maturity of their assets with their 
debt. The findings of this research provide evidence that the examined renewable energy 
firms tend to adjust their leverage levels towards the industry median one. To continue, we 
find that the factors Profitability, Market-to-book Assets, SG&A Expenses to Revenues, 
Dividends to Assets, Listed Firms Dummy and Common Law Dummy are negatively and 
significantly associated with leverage. Overall, we conclude that more profitable firms with 
higher expected growth require less debt, since they can finance their operations with 
accumulated internal funds. It is relevant to mention that our results for Market-to-book 
Assets highlight the elevated market expectations about the future prospects of the global 
renewable energy sector. Moreover, our findings suggest that the studied companies are 
characterized by high SG&A and dividend expenses, which imply that they have less 
available funds to cover the additional costs of using more debt. In regards to the Listed Firms 
Dummy, we conclude that the publicly traded entities from our sample have lower leverage 
since their access to the equity capital markets provides them with an efficient substitute of 
debt. Another interesting finding to emerge from our research is that the renewable energy 
companies, originating from countries with common law traditions, tend to have lower total 
leverage. To our surprise, tax-related determinants turn out to be insignificant, with effective 
tax rate being negatively correlated to leverage. The fact that 18 per cent of the companies in 
our sample are unaffected by corporate taxation could partly attribute to this unexpected 
result. Regarding Depreciation to Assets we fail to identify any prevailing trend in the 
coefficient sign. Furthermore, we conclude that past growth, measured through Change in Log 
Assets and CAPEX to Assets, has no impact on capital structure decisions in the studied 
sector. 
Concerning the period breakdown results, no major impact of the financial crisis 2008 
on the capital structure determinants is recognized. The only significant factor that underwent 
a substantial change is Median Industry Leverage, which turned from negative in the pre- and 
the crisis periods to positive in the post-crisis one. Our implication here is that during the first 
two periods some of the studied renewable energy companies were over-levered. Thus, in 
order to fight the adverse impact of the crisis, these firms had to substantially reduce their 
debt levels, arriving at a lower than the industry level leverage in the post-crisis times.  It is 
also worth mentioning that Firm Size became a highly significant factor during and post-
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crisis, signalling that due to the turbulent market environment, investors preferred putting 
their money into larger renewable energy companies during these two periods.  
Finally, the last research question of this paper consists of a comparative test of the 
factor predictions provided by the trade-off and pecking order theories, and our findings. The 
principal theoretical implication of our study is that the dynamic trade-off theory better 
describes the capital structure decisions in the studied renewable energy companies. 
Our master thesis has thrown up several questions in need of further investigation. 
Thus, it is recommended that additional research be undertaken in the following areas. First of 
all, as the scope of our study was limited in terms of data availability, it would be valuable to 
conduct an empirical research including larger number of companies during an extended 
observed period, covering several economic cycles. Second, we recommend any future 
investigation to examine the effect of institutional ownership and ownership concentration on 
leverage decisions in the renewable energy sector. Moreover, further research might explore 
how government subsidies affect the borrowing preferences in the industry. Last, but not the 
least, examining the role of corporate governance in leverage decisions might be worthwhile 
as it can add value, resulting in a more precise analysis form both theoretical and practical 
perspectives. Generally, our recommendations for future research would develop further the 
insights provided by our study on the capital structure determinants in the global renewable 
energy sector. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. List of included companies with their corresponding country of 
incorporation, law tradition and tax rate 
 
BDI-BIOENERGY INTERNAT.AG Austria Civil Law 25.00%
VERBUND AG INH. A Austria Civil Law 25.00%
XINJIANG GOLDW.SC.+T.H China Civil Law 25.00%
VESTAS WIND SYST. NAM.DK1 Denmark Civil Law 25.00%
THEOLIA EO 0,10 France Civil Law 33.33%
7C SOLARPARKEN AG O.N. Germany Civil Law 29.55%
AS ABWICKL.SOLAR.I.A. Germany Civil Law 29.55%
CAPITAL STAGE AG Germany Civil Law 29.55%
CROPENERGIES AG Germany Civil Law 29.55%
DALDRUP+SOEHNE AG Germany Civil Law 29.55%
ECOUNION AG Germany Civil Law 29.55%
ENERGIEKONTOR O.N. Germany Civil Law 29.55%
ENVITEC BIOGAS O.N. Germany Civil Law 29.55%
MANZ AG Germany Civil Law 29.55%
NORDEX SE O.N. Germany Civil Law 29.55%
PHOENIX SOLAR AG O.N. Germany Civil Law 29.55%
PNE WIND AG Germany Civil Law 29.55%
SFC ENERGY AG Germany Civil Law 29.55%
SOLAR-FABRIK AG O.N. Germany Civil Law 29.55%
SOLARWORLD AG O.N. Germany Civil Law 29.55%
SONNE + WIND BET.NA O.N. Germany Civil Law 29.55%
UMWELTBANK AG O.N. Germany Civil Law 29.55%
REC SILICON ASA NR 1 Norway Civil Law 28.00%
GAMESA CORP.TEC.I.EO-,17 Spain Civil Law 30.00%
SOLARIA ENERGIA Y M.EO-01 Spain Civil Law 30.00%
ENERG.DIEN.HLD.NAM.SF-,10 Switzerland Civil Law 18.01%
MEYER BUR.TECH.NAM.SF-,05 Switzerland Civil Law 18.01%
DYESOL LTD. Australia Common Law 30.00%
ENERGY DEV. LTD Australia Common Law 30.00%
GEODYNAMICS LTD Australia Common Law 30.00%
INFIGEN ENERGY Australia Common Law 30.00%
CHINA SING.SOL.TECH.DL-01 Bermuda Common Law 0.00%
HANERGY THI.F.P.G.HD-0025 Bermuda Common Law 0.00%
UNIT.PHOTOVOLTA.GR.HD-,10 Bermuda Common Law 0.00%
BALLARD PWR SYS (NEW) Canada Common Law 26.00%
CANADIAN SOLAR INC. Canada Common Law 26.00%
HYDROGENICS CORP. Canada Common Law 26.00%
INNERGEX RENEWABLE ENERGYCanada Common Law 26.00%
RAM POWER CORP. Canada Common Law 26.00%
Company name Country of incorporation Legal tradition
Corporate Tax 
Rate (2013)
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Source: information about tax rates is obtained from KPMG.com (2015), 
  list of companies part of RENIXX ® (Renewable-energy-industry.com, 2015) 
 
 
CHINA HIGH-SPEED DL-,01 Cayman Islands Common Law 0.00%
GCL POLY ENERGY HLDGS LTD Cayman Islands Common Law 0.00%
HANWHA Q CELLS CO. ADR/5 Cayman Islands Common Law 0.00%
JA SOLAR HLDGS ADR Cayman Islands Common Law 0.00%
SOLARGIGA ENERGY H. HD-01 Cayman Islands Common Law 0.00%
TRINA SOLAR ADR/50 DL-01 Cayman Islands Common Law 0.00%
YINGLI GREEN ADR/1 DL-,01 Cayman Islands Common Law 0.00%
SUZLON ENERGY LTD GDR/4 India Common Law 33.99%
SOLARTRON -FGN- BA 1 Thailand Common Law 20.00%
ALKANE ENERGY PLC LS-,005 United Kingdom Common Law 23.00%
PV CRYSTALOX SOLAR LS-052 United Kingdom Common Law 23.00%
ADVANCED EN. INDS DL-,001 United States Common Law 40.00%
AMER. SUPERCOND. DL-,01 United States Common Law 40.00%
AMTECH SYS INC. DL-,01 United States Common Law 40.00%
ASCENT SOLAR TEC.DL-,0001 United States Common Law 40.00%
FIRST SOLAR INC. D -,001 United States Common Law 40.00%
FUELCELL ENERGY DL-,0001 United States Common Law 40.00%
GREEN PLAINS INC. United States Common Law 40.00%
GT ADVANCED TECHS DL-,01 United States Common Law 40.00%
OCEAN POWER TECH. NEW United States Common Law 40.00%
ORMAT TECHNOLOG. DL-,001 United States Common Law 40.00%
PLUG POWER INC.NEW DL-,01 United States Common Law 40.00%
RGS ENERGY A DL-,0001 United States Common Law 40.00%
SPIRE CORP. DL -,01 United States Common Law 40.00%
SUNEDISON INC. DL -,01 United States Common Law 40.00%
SUNPOWER CORP. DL -,01 United States Common Law 40.00%
U.S. GEOTHERMAL I.DL-,001 United States Common Law 40.00%
RENESOLA LTD ADR 2 O.N. Virgin Islands Common Law 0.00%
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Appendix 2. Correlation matrix: book values 
 
Appendix 3. Correlation matrix: market values 
AVLEV COMLAW COSTR FSIZE GR INVR MNGP PBL PROF TANG TAX TS1
AVLEV 1.00  
COMLAW 0.00 - 
COSTR 0.02  0.13    
FSIZE 0.14  0.04 -   0.28 - 
GR 0.33 - 0.08    0.06 - 0.05 - 
INVR 0.13 - 0.16    0.09  0.13  0.04  
MNGP 0.08 - 0.03 -   0.06 - 0.09  0.00 - 0.00 - 
PBL 0.18  0.01 -   0.13 - 0.28  0.17 - 0.03  0.00  
PROF 0.19 - 0.19 -   0.36 - 0.36  0.16  0.02  0.15  0.06 - 
TANG 0.17  0.09    0.09 - 0.35  0.10 - 0.29  0.09  0.14  0.19  
TAX 0.01 - 0.05 -   0.02 - 0.04  0.07 - 0.03 - 0.06  0.00  0.05  0.01 - 
TS1 0.26  0.14 -   0.03  0.04 - 0.21 - 0.03 - 0.04 - 0.11  0.11 - 0.10  0.02 - 1.00  
AVLEV- Median Industry Leverage; COMLAW- Common Law Dummy; COSTR- SG&A Expenses to Revenues; FSIZE- Log of Assets; GR- 
Change in Log Assets; INVR- CAPEX to Assets; MNGP- Dividends to Assets; PBL- Listed Firms dummy; PROF- Operating Profit to Assets; 
TANG- Tangibility; TAX- Effective Tax Rate; TS1- Depreciation to Assets
TANG PROF FSIZE TS1 COSTR INVR AVLEV TAX MNGP COMLAW MTB
TANG 1.00  
PROF 0.05  
FSIZE 0.07  0.29  
TS1 0.24  0.09 - 0.09 - 
COSTR 0.04 - 0.40 - 0.29 - 0.04  
INVR 0.37  0.28 - 0.07 - 0.06  0.31  
AVLEV 0.21  0.14 - 0.02 - 0.26  0.08  0.03 - 
TAX 0.03  0.03  0.00  0.01 - 0.02 - 0.00 - 0.01  
MNGP 0.09  0.08  0.02  0.01 - 0.06 - 0.02 - 0.04 - 0.04  
COMLAW 0.09  0.20 - 0.07 - 0.13 - 0.21  0.13  0.00  0.05 - 0.03 - 
MTB 0.26 - 0.02  0.16  0.12 - 0.05  0.15 - 0.22 - 0.11 - 0.03 - 0.01    1.00  
TANG- Tangibility; PROF- Operating Profit to Assets;  FSIZE- Log of Assets; TS1- Depreciation to Assets; COSTR- SG&A Expenses to 
Revenues; INVR- CAPEX to Assets; AVLEV- Median Industry Leverage; TAX- Effective Tax Rate; MNGP- Dividends to Assets; COMLAW- 
Common Law Dummy; MTB- Market-to-book Assets
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Appendix 4. Pooled regression results 
 
Source: created by the authors using EViews 8.1. Formatted in Microsoft Excel. 
Dependent Variable: LEV
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 05/11/15   Time: 14:46
Sample (adjusted): 2006 2013
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 298
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 536
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.0783 0.0572 -1.3679 0.1719
TANG 0.4353 0.0337 12.9191 0.0000
PROF 0.0073 0.0322 0.2275 0.8202
FSIZE 0.0191 0.0045 4.2050 0.0000
GR 0.0980 0.1173 0.8357 0.4037
TS1 0.1379 0.1335 1.0326 0.3023
COSTR -0.0080 0.0032 -2.4871 0.0132
INVR -0.0001 0.0821 -0.0017 0.9986
AVLEV 0.4358 0.1076 4.0500 0.0001
TAX -0.0100 0.0113 -0.8865 0.3757
MNGP -0.4089 0.4450 -0.9188 0.3586
COMLAW -0.0273 0.0153 -1.7819 0.0753
PBL -0.1382 0.0314 -4.3956 0.0000
R-squared 0.4068     Mean dependent var 0.2228
Adjusted R-squared 0.3932     S.D. dependent var 0.2103
S.E. of regression 0.1638     Akaike info criterion -0.7561
Sum squared resid 14.0364     Schwarz criterion -0.6522
Log likelihood 215.6340     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.7154
F-statistic 29.8890     Durbin-Watson stat 0.4970
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000
AVLEV- Median Industry Leverage; COMLAW- Common Law 
Dummy; COSTR- SG&A Expenses to Revenues; FSIZE- Log of 
Assets; GR- Change in Log Assets; INVR- CAPEX to Assets; MNGP- 
Dividends to Assets; PBL- Listed Firms dummy; PROF- Operating 
Profit to Assets; TANG- Tangibility; TAX- Effective Tax Rate; TS1- 
Depreciation to Assets
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Appendix 5. Descriptive statistics: market value 
Observations
Debt Ratios Definition
Firm-specific determinants
Profitability Operating Profit to Assets 412 -0.02 0.04 1.24 -3.67 0.29 81519.50 0.00
Size Log of Assets 412 13.30 13.31 17.12 7.78 1.84 4.13 0.13
Change in Log Assets - - - - - - -
CAPEX to Assets 412 0.07 0.03 0.87 -0.27 0.11 8061.11 0.00
Market-to-book Assets 412 1.53 1.10 15.51 -19.49 1.85 47447.52 0.00
Tangibility 412 0.29 0.20 1.28 0.00 0.27 71.93 0.00
SG&A Expenses to Revenues 412 0.60 0.14 16.34 0.00 1.76 29854.87 0.00
Policy and Decision factor Dividends to Assets 412 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.02 1064282.00 0.00
Industry-specific determinants
Median Industry Leverage 412 0.18 0.16 0.30 0.09 0.08 46.09 0.00
Listed Firms dummy - - - - - - -
Tax-related determinants
Potential Debt Tax Shields Effective Tax Rate 412 0.08 0.06 5.16 -9.65 0.70 157743.30 0.00
Nondebt Tax Shield Depreciation to Assets 412 0.04 0.02 0.83 0.00 0.07 99609.40 0.00
Macroeconomic determinants
Legal traditions Common Law Dummy 412 0.56 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 68.73 0.00
Growth
Nature of Assets
Industry Conditions
Jarque-Bera
 JB P -valueMean Median Maximum Minimum
Standard 
Deviation
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Appendix 6. Comparison of theoretical predictions with data results: full sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm-specific determinants
Profitability Operating Profit to Assets + - - -
Log of Assets + + - +
Change in Log Assets - - + -
CAPEX to Assets - - + -
Market-to-book Assets - - + -
Tangibility + + - +
SG&A Expenses to Revenues - - + -
Policy and Decision Factor Dividends to Assets + + - -
Industry-specific determinants
Median Industry Leverage + + ? +
Listed Firms Dummy ? ? ? -
Tax-related determinants
Potential Debt Tax Shields Effective Tax Rate + + ? -
Nondebt Tax Shield Depreciation to Assets - - ? +
Macroeconomic determinants
Legal Traditions Common Law Dummy ? ? ? -
Definition
Static Trade-off 
Theory
Dynamic Trade-
off Theory
Pecking Order 
Theory Data
Size
Growth
Nature of Assets
Industry Conditions
Determinants
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Appendix 7. Comparison of theoretical predictions with data results: period breakdown 
 
 
Firm-specific determinants
Profitability Operating Profit to Assets + - - -
Log of Assets + + - +
Change in Log Assets - - + +
CAPEX to Assets - - + -
Market-to-book Assets - - + -
Tangibility + + - +
SG&A Expenses to Revenues - - + -
Policy and Decision Factor Dividends to Assets + + - -
Industry-specific determinants
Median Industry Leverage + + ? -
Listed Firms Dummy ? ? ? -
Tax-related determinants
Potential Debt Tax Shields Effective Tax Rate + + ? -
Nondebt Tax Shield Depreciation to Assets - - ? -
Macroeconomic determinants
Legal Traditions Common Law Dummy ? ? ? -
Definition
Static Trade-off 
Theory
Dynamic Trade-
off Theory
Pecking Order 
Theory Data
Size
Growth
Nature of Assets
Industry Conditions
Determinants
